1983: Established Theories. Philosophy of Science 50, 603-617. With Larry Hardin.

These are defined as mature theories with known validity limits. The notion of ‘approximate theory’ used in scientific realism is thus quantified yielding to ontological levels.

1989: The Logic of Reduction: the Case of Gravitation. Foundations of Physics 19, 1151-1170.

It is shown that a meaning change (a change in the ontology of the theory) is necessary for the reduction (in the sense used by scientists) of general relativity to Newtonian gravitation theory.

1991: Computer Simulation in the Physical Sciences. PSA 1990, Volume 2, 507-618. Philosophy of Science Association.

Claims by examples that computer simulation provides a qualitatively new methodology in the physical sciences.

1997: Cognitive Emergence. Philosophy of Science 64, Supplement 4, S346-S358.

Cognitively incommensurable ontologies are related by unique bridge laws.

2001: Cognitive Scientific Realism. Philosophy of Science 68, 185-202.

Levels of scientific theories that permit an understanding of the physical world require ontological bridges between them. They are exemplified by four case
studies.

2004: Realism Despite Cognitive Antireductionism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18, 73-88.

It is argued that realism can be maintained despite the cognitive incoherence of different ontological levels. The argument is based on the mathematical relationship between levels and the unique inferences by means of ontological bridges. Strong arguments against fundamentalism are given.

There exist over a dozen other publications in history and philosophy of physics.